Conclusion
The Pakistani armed forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by their eastern adversary, if they are armed effectively. Notably, credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving its objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. Thus, for such a credible capability, Pakistan needs to invest both in strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons. Both categories of the weapons need nuclear fissile material. The demand of the fissile material increases with the shift at the technical level of the adversary’s strategy coupled with its persistence denial of bilateral nuclear restrain regime proposal or a comprehensive arms control treaty. Thus, strategic challenges should be addressed with realistic strategic calculations rather than idealist or pacifist notions of nuclear abolitionists or non-proliferationists. Pakistan’s stance on the FMCT and other items of the CD agenda should take into account or serve the strategic interest of the country rather than intending to please any Great Power or exposing any other state at the Conference on Disarmament.
